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ABSTRACT
A small subsection of the literature on Nietzsche’s political philosophy focuses on a key
passage that appears in the sixth section of “Schopenhauer as Educator.” In this passage,
Nietzsche claims that the individual’s life attains its highest value by living for the benefit of
humanity’s rarest and most valuable specimens. Some philosophers, like John Rawls and
Thomas Hurka, take this passage to be sufficient evidence of a larger commitment on
Nietzsche’s part to aristocracy. Others oppose Rawls’ and Hurka’s interpretations, claiming that
this key passage is evidence of a commitment to democracy. However, both sides are incorrect.
This particular section of “Schopenhauer as Educator” is actually evidence of Nietzsche’s
commitment to divorcing cultural institutions from the influence of states in toto. I explain why
Nietzsche is committed neither to aristocracy nor to democracy, and how the passage from
“Schopenhauer as Educator” commits Nietzsche to a post-political position.
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Introduction

In the sixth section of “Schopenhauer as Educator,” Nietzsche says:
For surely the question is: How can your life, the life of the individual, obtain the highest
value, the deepest significance? How is it least wasted? Surely only by living for the
benefit of the rarest and most valuable specimens, not for the benefit of the majority, that
is, for the benefit of those who, taken as individuals, are the least valuable specimens. 1
Scholars with political interests often think of the above quote (hereafter called “the focal
passage”) as evidence of Nietzsche’s political commitments. 2
Some use the focal passage to paint Nietzsche as a political philosopher dedicated to
aristocracy. We might call this Nietzsche the “Aristocratic Nietzsche.” John Rawls, for instance,
thinks that the focal passage is part of Nietzsche’s “teleological theory directing society to
arrange institutions and to define the duties and obligations of individuals so as to maximize the
achievement of human excellence in art, science, and culture”;3 a society where “mankind must
continually strive to produce great individuals.”4 Rather problematically, Rawls offers only a
single piece of evidence for his interpretation. He directs readers to consult passages cited by G.
A. Morgan in his What Nietzsche Means.5 In particular, Rawls goes out of his way to draw the
reader’s attention to the focal passage, saying: “Particularly striking is Nietzsche’s statement:
‘Mankind must work continually to produce individual great human beings—this and nothing
else is the task…for the question is this: how can your life, the individual life, retain the highest
value, the deepest significance?...Only by living for the good of the rarest and most valuable

1

UM III:6, 216.
For a (by no means complete) selection of literature that deals with Nietzsche’s ties to aristocracy or democracy,
see: Ansell-Pearson, 1994; Clark, 2015; Hurka, 1993; Cavell, 2004; Lemm, 2007; Conant, 2001; Russell, 1945;
Rorty, 1989; and Conway, 1997.
3 Rawls 1971, 285-286.
4 Rawls 1971, 286.
5 Morgan, 1941, 40-42 and 369-376.
2
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specimens.’”6 Rawls leans quite heavily—almost entirely—on the focal passage to make his
case.
Thomas Hurka, building on Rawls’ discussion of Nietzsche, also believes that the focal
passage is evidence of Nietzsche’s aristocratic commitments. He says, for instance, in his
“Nietzsche: Perfectionist,” that
Nietzsche is famously antiegalitarian, favouring an aristocratic society and a strict ‘order of
rank’ among individuals. And his antiegalitarianism rests on a distinctive view about social
aggregation, whereby the value in a society depends not on the total or average perfection
of all its members but on the excellence of its few most perfect members. This view is
expressed repeatedly in Nietzsche’s writings, from the earliest to the latest. 7
From there, Hurka too quotes the focal passage to defend his claims. Though Hurka presents
more evidence than Rawls—which is to say, he presents more than just the focal passage as
proof of his interpretation—his assessment of Nietzsche’s political views relies heavily on the
focal passage, and on Rawls’ assessment of Nietzsche’s political views in A Theory of Justice.
Hurka’s reliance on Rawls becomes especially clear when he contrasts Nietzsche and Rawls:
Whereas Rawls wants society to maximize the well-being of its worst-off individuals,
Nietzsche wants it to concentrate on the best, since only their perfection has value.
Reflection on Rawls may suggest a ‘lexical maximax’ principle, according to which
society should first maximize the excellence of its best individuals, then when nothing
more can be done for them, the next-best individuals, and so on. But this lexical principle
seems less true to Nietzsche’s view than simple maximax: he seems to find no value
whatever in the achievements of lesser humans, so once the best have developed as far as
they can it is a matter of indifference what other individuals do. 8
Others use the focal passage to fashion Nietzsche into a champion of democracy. We
might call this the “Democratic Nietzsche.” The aim of Stanley Cavell’s book, Conditions
Handsome and Unhandsome, for instance, “is not simply to show that it [“Schopenhauer as
Educator”] is tolerable to the life of justice in a constitutional democracy but to show how it is

6

Rawls 1971, 286, fn. 50.
Hurka 2007,17-18.
8 Hurka 2007, 18.
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essential to that life.”9 Cavell, explicitly opposing Rawls’ reading of the focal passage, contends
that the focal passage does not constitute a principle of political perfectionism, but rather, is a
call to disdain what Cavell calls “official culture.” Disdain for official culture, Cavell says, “is
itself an expression of democracy and commitment to it.”10 The focal passage, according to
Cavell, expresses a sentiment found in both Nietzsche and Emerson—a call to emphasize the life
of genuine culture, which is itself inherently egalitarian. James Conant echoes, and further
develops, Cavell’s arguments by identifying affinities between the sentiments expressed in the
focal passage and conceptions of democracy developed by thinkers like John Adams and
Thomas Jefferson, who believed that democracy’s purpose was
not to overthrow the idea of a society ‘ruled by the best,’ but to exchange one form of
aristocracy for another: to replace ‘an artificial aristocracy’ founded on the contingent
precedents of ‘wealth and birth’ with ‘an unprecedented aristocracy’ from whose ranks
ideally no one is, as a matter of contingent social circumstance, excluded. 11
In short, the focal passage has been transformed by Hurka, Rawls, Cavell, and Conant,
into a locus for demonstrations of Nietzsche’s commitments to aristocracy or democracy. On the
one side, thinkers like Rawls and Hurka take the focal passage to be sufficient evidence of
Nietzsche’s commitments to aristocratic political arrangements. On the other, Cavell and Conant,
targeting Rawls’ interpretation of the focal passage, argue that the focal passage reveals a
commitment to true culture, an attitude that harmonizes with particular forms of democracy.
In this paper, I will argue that those who take the focal passage as evidence of
Nietzsche’s commitments to democracy or aristocracy are mistaken. The “Aristocratic
Nietzsche” and “Democratic Nietzsche,” as personas fashioned out of a misuse of the focal
passage, are fictions, so long as they rely on the focal passage as evidence of Nietzsche’s

9

Cavell 1980, 56.
Cavell 1980, 50.
11 Conant 2001, 228.
10
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political commitments. At most, the focal passage commits Nietzsche to a very minimal political
position, one that is neither democratic nor aristocratic.
2

Nietzsche’s Notion of the Political

In his Nietzsche on Morality, Brian Leiter presents a helpful distinction between two
different ways of attributing political thought to Nietzsche. 12 One the one hand, one might argue
that Nietzsche consciously attempted to engage in political theorizing. On the other hand, one
might claim that Nietzsche’s work has important political implications. In other words, (1) we
can say that Nietzsche consciously attempted to produce a theoretical framework for his political
philosophy, constructed out of the focal passage and other scattered remarks on politics, or (2)
we can point to the focal passage and claim that it has real and important political implications,
regardless of whether Nietzsche intended for it to have said implications.
In what follows, I argue that (1) is false and claim that while (2) is correct, it is not
correct in the way that Cavell, Rawls, and others believe. (1) is false because, when read in
context, the focal passage provides no solid evidence for some claim that Nietzsche was
interested in developing a systematic political theory. With some qualifications to be introduced
below, (2) is true, but we should not take the focal passage as committing Nietzsche to either
aristocracy or democracy. Contrary, perhaps, to what Nietzsche believes, the focal passage has
real and significant political implications, but those implications do not involve an implicit bias
in favor of either democracy or aristocracy. That is, Nietzsche’s principles commit him neither to
democracy nor aristocracy. Rather, they commit him to what might be called a “post-political”
position, i.e., to a position that demands that society move entirely beyond an emphasis on the
political.

12

See Leiter 2015, 232-243.
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To make the case that the focal passage does not provide evidence of a conscious
political commitment on Nietzsche’s part, and in order to claim that the focal passage commits
Nietzsche to a post-political position, it is necessary to clarify what it means for something to be
“political.” What follows, then, is a discussion of what it means for something (an act, a
philosophy, etc.) to be political.
In Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche says:
If you invest all your energy in economics, world commerce, parliamentarianism, military
engagements, power and power politics – if you take the quantum of intelligence,
seriousness, will, and self-overcoming that you embody and expend it all in this one
direction, then there won’t be any left for the other direction. Culture and the state – let us
be honest with ourselves here – these are adversaries: ‘Kultur-Staat’ is just a modern idea.
The one lives off the other, the one flourishes at the expense of the other. All the great ages
of culture have been ages of political decline: anything great in the cultural sense is
apolitical, even anti-political.13
He goes on to say that “in the history of European culture, the rise of the ‘Reich’ means one thing
above all else: a shift in emphasis.”14 We find in this passage the clearest definition of the
political, via negativa, in Nietzsche’s corpus.15 Here, Nietzsche explicitly ties the political to the
concept of a state. That is, when Nietzsche discusses what it means for something to be political,
that discussion occurs only in reference to some state. We might say that, according to Nietzsche,

13

TI Germans 4, 188.
TI Germans 4, 188.
15 Twilight of the Idols, obviously, is a much later work than the Unfashionable Observations. As such, one might
justifiably look upon my reliance on Twilight with skepticism. Fortunately, Nietzsche discusses the adversarial
nature of culture and the state several times in his earlier writings. The quotes from On the Future of Our
Educational Institutions and from the Unfashionable Observations in subsequent paragraphs perform some
justificatory work, but Nietzsche also says in Human, All Too Human, written four years after the publication of
“Schopenhauer as Educator,” “Perhaps the production of genius is reserved to only a limited period in the life of
mankind…. Forces such as condition the production of art, for example, could simply d ie out…. Indeed, if life were
ever to be ordered within the perfect state, there would no longer exist in the present any motive whatever for poetry
and fiction…” (HH §235, 112). Immediately after, he claims that “if this state [the perfect state] is achie ved
mankind would have become too feeble still to be able to produce genius” (HH §235, 112). And again, in the third
lecture from On the Future of Our Educational Institutions, Nietzsche discusses the state’s subordination of culture
towards its ends, describing culture “under the guiding star of the state” as a “pseudo -culture” (FEI III, 78). I simply
use the section from Twilight because it provides the clearest definition of the political and a helpful discussion of
the relationship between the political and the cultural.
14
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anything that we would call “political” is such only by virtue of the fact that it takes a position
on, or depends on, some aspect of a state. Further, anything engaged in an investment of energy
into a state is political. In short, according to Nietzsche, something is political if and only if it
references some state. Thus, economics, world commerce, parliamentarianism, military
engagements, and so on are all “political” because each of these involves an investment of
energy in the flourishing of a state. We might, thus, say that a revolutionary group’s work to
overthrow a dictatorial government, and to establish a democracy, is “political” work, because
the revolutionary group is investing its energy in opposing a tyrannical state, and working
towards the establishment of a new democratic state.
Nietzsche claims that the cultural is “apolitical, even anti-political,” because, according
to Nietzsche, genuine culture is possible only when it is not dependent upon some state. That is
why he claims, in the third lecture of his On the Future of Our Educational Institutions, that
the modern state is accustomed in these things to take part in the discussion [regarding
education] and is wont to accompany its demands with a blow in its defense…a ‘culture
state’ [Kulturstaat], as one now says, is for the rest something young and has become a
‘matter of self-evidence’…. Precisely by the most powerful modern state, by Prussia, this
right to the highest leadership in education and school has been taken so seriously, that,
with the boldness that is characteristic of this political system, the dubious principle [the
necessity of an excess of schools] adopted by it receives a significance understood as
universally threatening and dangerous for the true German spirit….[The] state presents
itself as a mystagogue of culture [Kultur] and while it advances its purposes, it compels
each of its servants to appear before it only with the torch of universal state education in
their hands.16
In short, the idea of a “culture state,” i.e., the idea that culture exists only at the behest of the
modern state, is only a modern idea—an idea that threatens true German culture. It is for this
reason that Goethe was, apparently, disappointed by the “Wars of Liberation,” when Germany
liberated itself from French rule, establishing the German Confederation and ushering in a period

16

FEI III, 74-75.
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of heightened German nationalism. It is also for this reason that Nietzsche claims that “France’s
significance is changing to that of a cultural power,”17 stating that “almost all psychological and
artistic questions get taken up there [in Paris] with incomparably greater finesse and care than in
Germany, — the Germans are altogether incapable of this type of seriousness.”18 The German
emphasis on the power of the state makes Germans incapable of dealing with cultural questions,
specifically because the state and the political are opposed to culture and the cultural. An
emphasis on the power of the state entails a reduced emphasis on cultural matters. The state
presents itself as the guiding star of culture so that “the intellectual energies of a generation…can
serve and be of use to the existing institutions…. This liberating is at the same time, and to a
greater degree, a shackling.”19 It is for these reasons that Nietzsche, rightly or wrongly,
conceives of culture as anti-political.
To be clear, Nietzsche does not think that the state and culture have always existed in this
parasitic relationship. In his essay “The Greek State,” written in 1871, Nietzsche tells us that the
Greeks must be construed “in relation to the unique zenith of their art, as being a priori ‘political
men par excellence’.”20 Nietzsche believes that in Greece, culture and the state went hand-inhand. Thus, he asks, “what does this naïve barbarism of the Greek state indicate, and what will
be its excuse at the throne of eternal justice? The state appears before it proudly and calmly:
leading the magnificently blossoming woman, Greek society, by the hand.”21 In a lecture
delivered the following year, Nietzsche continues to characterize the relationship of the Greek
state to its culture. For the ancient Greeks, “the state was not a border guard, regulator, or
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TI Germans 4, 188.
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overseer for his culture; rather the robust, muscular comrade, ready for battle, and companion on
the way, who gives the admired, nobler, and as it were, unearthly [überirdischen] friend safe
conduct through the harsh realities and for that earns his thankfulness.”22 The relationship
between the state and culture in Ancient Greece was not parasitic, but was, rather, symbiotic.
So, when he says that culture is necessarily anti-political, or when he says that genuine
culture can only exist independent of the state, he means modern culture and modern states, not
culture and states generally speaking. Things change, and over time culture’s relationship to the
state changed. Nietzsche sees the history of the relationship between the state and culture as a
history of separation. The modern state, in contrast with the ancient Greek state, no longer has a
symbiotic relationship with culture. The symbiotic relationship between state and culture, carries,
so it would seem, only as far as the Middle Ages (perhaps as far as the Reformation), when
“inimical forces were more or less held together and to some extent assimilated to one another by
the church.”23 Yet, “the Reformation declared many things to be adiaphora, to be the domain in
which religion should not hold sway; this was the price at which it bought its own existence—
just as Christianity, confronted with the far more religious world of antiquity, had to pay a
similar price in order to guarantee its own existence.”24 Christianity, however, eventually fell to
the selfishness of the modern state:
Christianity is certainly one of the purest manifestations of that drive for culture, and
especially of that drive for the ever-renewed production of the saint, but since it was used
in a hundred ways to drive the mills of state power, it gradually became sick to the very
marrow, hypocritical and dishonest, until it degenerated to the point of standing in
contradiction to its original goal.25

22

FEI III, 77.
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24 UM III:4, 199-200.
25 UM III:6, 220.
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In Nietzsche’s day, “the state wants people to worship in it the very same idols they previously
worshipped in the church,”26 and as a result of that desire, “does indeed attempt…to organize
everything anew out of itself and provide a bond that will hold these inimical forces in check.”27
The modern state, as Nietzsche sees it, is a parasite, promoting the health and development of
culture only as much as is necessary to maximize its power. Thus, Nietzsche thinks that, contrary
to the ancient Greek state, the modern state “presents itself as a mystagogue of culture,”28
compelling culture to do its bidding.
In short, Nietzsche conceives of the relationship between culture and the state in two
ways, the modern way and the ancient way. The ancient state’s relationship to culture was
symbiotic—the state acted as a companion and friend to culture, protecting cultural endeavors
without expecting a return on its investment. At this time, culture was not anti-political, but
rather, was explicitly political. The modern state’s relationship to culture, however, is not
unselfish, and thus, culture has necessarily become anti-political, for the sake of its existence.
The modern state’s relationship to culture is parasitic, seeking to profit “from the dissemination
of cultivation among its citizens”29 by “liberating the intellectual energies of a generation to the
extent—but only to that extent—that they can serve and be of use to existing institutions.”30 As a
direct result of the changes in the state’s relationship to culture, culture has, in Nietzsche’s mind,
become necessarily anti-political.
The realization that culture was not always anti-political might lead one to believe that
Nietzsche must surely affirm an aristocratic arrangement of political institutions. After all, if

26

UM III:4, 200.
UM III:4, 200.
28 FEI III, 75.
29 UM III:6, 219.
30 UM III:6, 220.
27

10

Nietzsche thinks of the symbiotic relationship between culture and the state as positive, he must
desire a return to the way things were. Perhaps Nietzsche seeks a return to the ancient Greek way
of conducting the affairs of state. Yet, the idea that Nietzsche seeks to return to the ancient way
of relating the state to culture is certainly false, because he clearly conceives of the purpose of
cultural institutions as moving beyond any relationship with the state generally speaking. One of
the tasks of this essay is to demonstrate this point, and I will return to it in Section VI.
With a clear understanding of what it means for something to be “political” or “antipolitical” now on the table, we can turn to what it would mean for the focal passage to provide
evidence of Nietzsche’s “democratic” or “aristocratic” commitments. With these four terms—
political, anti-political, democratic, and aristocratic—well defined, we should be positioned to
assess what evidence the focal passage provides of Nietzsche’s political commitments. It seems
that, for the focal passage to constitute evidence of some conscious or unconscious commitment
to democracy or aristocracy, it would have to provide evidence of a commitment to an
investment in, or to the creation of, a democratic or an aristocratic state.
On the one hand, if the focal passage is evidence of a consciously pro-democratic
political philosophy, then it must be the case that the focal passage constitutes, in part, an explicit
endorsement of efforts to bring about a democratic state. Likewise, if the focal passage is
evidence of a consciously pro-aristocratic political philosophy, it must be the case that the focal
passage constitutes part of an explicit effort on Nietzsche’s part to bring about an aristocratic
state (this seems to be Rawls’ view in A Theory of Justice). On the other hand, if, despite
Nietzsche’s intentions, the focal passage entails certain democratic commitments, it must be the
case that the focal passage commits Nietzsche (unconsciously) to an investment in the well-being

11

of a democratic state. Likewise, if Nietzsche is committed (unconsciously) to aristocracy, it must
be the case that the focal passage entails an investment in the creation of an aristocratic state.
If the focal passage provides evidence of political commitments, conscious or
unconscious, it must be the case that it provides evidence of a commitment to the well-being of
some state; for the political, by Nietzsche’s definition, is such only insofar as it exists in relation
to some state. In short, if the focal passage provides evidence for the “Democratic Nietzsche,” it
must provide evidence that Nietzsche is (consciously or unconsciously) committed to the wellbeing of a democratic state. If the focal passage provides evidence for the “Aristocratic
Nietzsche,” it must provide evidence that Nietzsche is (consciously or unconsciously) committed
to the well-being of an aristocratic state.
3

On Becoming What One Is

To understand whether the focal passage has political implications (whether intended or
unintended by Nietzsche), we first must know what kinds of things we are, because this
understanding is central to what Nietzsche calls “the circle of culture,” which Nietzsche sets in
opposition to the state and its forces. In this section, I address the important underlying concepts
composing Nietzsche’s notion of individual persons and introduce some key terms of art.
We find throughout Nietzsche’s various works a portrait of human life according to
which our possibilities are tightly circumscribed. That is to say, Nietzsche is a fatalist. Each life
has an end-point that “is fixed in advance in virtue of an individual’s nature, that is, the largely
immutable physiological and psychological facts that make the person who he is.”31 Put another
way, “each of us has an essential psycho-physical constitution – a set of type-facts that make us
what we are.”32 In this respect, a person is like a tomato plant. A tomato plant grows tomatoes; it

31
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Leiter 1998, 219.
Leiter 2015, 76.
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will never grow peaches or corn. The extent to which it flourishes successfully varies, depending
on other important environmental factors that inhibit or promote the plant’s flourishing. The
plant may, for instance, grow in fertile or barren soil, it may get a lot of rain or very little, it may
have exposure to full sunlight or none, etc.. Thus, “the natural facts about the tomato plant
circumscribe, as it were, the possible trajectories, though they themselves do not uniquely
determine which of these is realized.”33 A successful tomato plant, grown under optimal
conditions, may produce tomatoes, but it could also grow in barren soil and die, it might exist in
a cold climate and grow miniscule, cat-faced tomatoes, or it could get too little rain and become
stunted, barely alive but producing no fruit.
Likewise, different types of human beings, depending on their constitutions and
environments, will have varying ranges of possibilities. For instance, Nietzsche discusses a
priestly type in The Gay Science. A priestly type of person possesses a particular set of typefacts—“prudent, cowlike serenity, piety and country parson meekness which lies in the meadow
and earnestly and ruminantly observes life”34 —that allow the priestly type to flourish under
certain conditions. Yet, much like the tomato plant, the priestly type’s possibilities are
circumscribed by the environment in which she finds herself. Her society might not revere the
particular sort of wisdom characteristic of priestly types, “the mild, serious/simple- minded and
chaste priestly natures and whatever is related to them.”35 The priestly type’s society might
(however unlikely) venerate philosophers, who “have always felt the most remote”36 from
priestly types. These circumstances would limit her capacity to realize fully what she is.
Depending on the conditions, these circumstances may even prevent her from ever becoming

33
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what she is. That is to say, we might draw a distinction between an individual’s identity as some
type and that individual’s capacity to become a successful instance of some type. The individua l
mentioned above may be a priestly type, but contingent circumstances affect her ability to lead a
successful life as an instance of that type.
4

The Dark Drive

In “Schopenhauer as Educator,” Nietzsche states that we all have a “dark,” which is to
say an unconscious, “drive” that pushes us towards the production of genius. He says:
Every human being tends to discover in himself a limitation—of his talents as well as of
his moral will—that fills him with longing and melancholy; and just as he longs to rise up
out of his feeling of sinfulness to what is holy, so as an intellectual being he bears a
profound yearning for the genius within himself. This is the root of all true culture….
Wherever we find talent without this longing, as we do in scholarly circles or also among
so-called cultivated people, it arouses revulsion and disgust, for we sense that such human
beings, with all their intelligence, do not further, but instead hinder an emerging culture
and the production of genius—which is the aim of all culture.37
Most people hide from the discovery of their limitations, hide from their drive, because most are
wont to “sink into a contemplative laziness and ultimately even forfeit out of laziness their
ability to contemplate.”38 Such people view this drive towards the production of genius as
unpleasant memories [that] suddenly force themselves upon us and we make an effort to
drive them out of our heads by means of violent gestures and sounds; but the gestures and
sounds of common life indicate that all of us always find ourselves in such a state of fear
of memory and of turning inward…. Ghostly things are occurring around us, every
moment of life wants to tell us something, but we do not want to hear this ghostly voice.
When we are quiet and alone we are afraid something will be whispered in our ear, and
hence we despise quiet and drug ourselves with sociability. 39
In short, the striving for culture is “universal [allgemein],” despite the fact that knowledge of the
goal to produce culture is “extraordinarily scant and rare.”40 We hide from our drive to produce
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genius, partially because we are lazy, and partly because we fear the difficulties that awakening
towards that drive entails. It seems odd, however, that one would claim that we drive
unconsciously towards producing genius. To understand why Nietzsche believes in this dark
drive, we must know what genius is.
Nietzsche begins section six of “Schopenhauer as Educator” with a biological claim, an
observation derived from
every single species of animal and plant life, namely, that the only thing that matters is the
superior individual specimen, the more unusual, more powerful, more complex, more
fruitful specimen….[It] is easy to understand that the goal of any species’ evolution is that
point at which it reaches its limit and begins the transition to a higher species; its goal is
not a large number of specimens and their well-being, nor is it those specimens that are the
last to evolve. On the contrary, its goal is precisely those seemingly scattered and random
existences that arise here and there under favorable conditions. 41
Here we might detect some tension. Nietzsche seems, on my interpretation, to hold a strongly
anti-teleological position. Becoming what we are, for instance, is not a matter of us realizing
what we were meant to be, in the sense that there is some ultimate purpose towards which we
strive. Yet in the above quotation, Nietzsche appears to claim that the evolution of each and
every species has a goal.
We should be careful, however, about how we interpret the perspective from which
Nietzsche speaks. There are two ways of understanding Nietzsche’s use of terms like “matters,”
“favorable,” and “goal.” We could either understand Nietzsche as saying that, (1) from an
objective perspective, i.e., from the standpoint of Nature itself, the purpose of evolution is to get
a species to a point where it transitions into a higher species, or that, (2) from the perspective of
human culture, the goal of our evolution is to get us to the point where we transition to a higher
species.

41
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In other words, the question we should ask ourselves is, “For whom does it matter that a
species evolves?” If Nietzsche were saying (1), he would be attributing some agency or
purposiveness to nature. Nature would (somehow) know and care whether or not we evolve.
Nietzsche would be arguing for a bizarre interpretation of Darwinism, where Nature has a plan
for humankind or has some mechanism by which it strives to produce some higher type of
human being. As Nietzsche says only a year or so before writing “Schopenhauer as Educator,”
There is nothing so reprehensible or low in nature that it would not immediately be inflated
like a balloon by a small breath of that power of knowledge; and just as every porter wants
to have his admirer, so the proudest of men, the philosopher, believes that the eyes of the
universe are trained on his actions and thoughts like telescopes from all sides. 42
In other words, the idea that the universe cares about us enough to have a plan or a purpose for
our development is nothing more than an artifact of the philosopher’s pride. Thus, I find it
unlikely that Nietzsche attributes to Nature the agency necessary for (1) to be the case, for it
would contradict his claim that the universe has no plan or purpose for us. Rather, I think it more
likely that Nietzsche is saying (2)—that it matters to us that, from the perspective of human
culture, human beings make the transition to a higher species; that what is important to us is the
superior individual specimen. In other words, our goal, from the perspective of human culture, is
to strive for the production of “those seemingly scattered and random existences that arise here
and there under favorable conditions.”43
Geniuses are a higher type. That is, geniuses represent a transition to a higher sort of
being. Nietzsche will later echo this claim in Thus Spoke Zarathustra when Zarathustra says:
“What is the ape to a human? A laughing stock or a painful embarrassment. And that is precisely
what the human shall be to the overman: a laughing stock or a painful embarrassment.”44 That is
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to say, we regular human beings, individuals who are not geniuses, are to higher types what apes
are to us—beings lower on the chain of evolution and a relic of some less advanced stage of their
development; embarrassingly underdeveloped in comparison. We, as a species, evolve. Higher
types represent the next step in an evolutionary process, and so we drive, albeit unconsciously,
towards the production of higher types.
Nietzsche notes “how extraordinarily scant and rare the knowledge of that goal [the
production of higher types] is, how universal, by contrast, the striving for culture is, and how
unspeakably large are the amounts of energy that are expended in its service.”45 Sometimes, “we
ask ourselves in amazement: ‘Is such knowledge perhaps not necessary at all? Does nature
achieve its goal even if the majority of people misconceive of the aim of their own
exertions?’.”46 Yet, “there are moments when we understand this; then the clouds break and we
perceive how we…are pressing onward toward the human being as toward something that stands
high above us.”47 That is, for some of us, there are moments when that dark drive becomes
clearer, and we can see the goal towards which we, in our normal states of mind, unconsciously
and unreflectively press—the production of a higher type.
Some individuals, upon realizing the goal towards which everything strives, might be
inclined to say that it does not matter that the drive towards the production of genius remains
dark for most of us. “Anyone who is accustomed to holding the unconscious purposiveness of
nature in high regard will perhaps have no difficulty in answering: ‘Yes, indeed, that’s the way it
is! Let human beings think and speak about their ultimate goal in any manner they wish; in their
dark drive they are yet well aware of the proper path.’”48 But Nietzsche thinks it necessary to
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refute this opinion. For the promotion of the emergence of higher types requires that the dark
drive become a conscious intention to produce higher types, because, so long as the drive to
produce genius remains dark, culture will be misused and exploited by “powers that today most
actively promote culture [for] ulterior motives.”49
5

The Focal Passage as Evidence for a Political Theory

In this section, I address the issue of whether the focal passage is evidence of a conscious
attempt on Nietzsche’s part to develop some political theory—i.e., whether the focal passage is
part of some philosophical theory directing society to arrange the institutions of a state, and to
define the duties and obligations of members of a state, in some particular way so as to promote
higher culture. Rawls, as we have seen, believes that the focal passage indicates a full
“teleological theory directing society to arrange institutions and to define the duties and
obligations of individuals so as to maximize the achievement of human excellence in art, science,
and culture.”50 Here we must ask whether the focal passage does provide evidence for the
position that Nietzsche conceived of himself as a political thinker (significant or not). Does it, for
instance, support the claim that Nietzsche was trying to fashion a robust teleological political
theory, built on some principle of perfection, which implores us to arrange institutions and duties
to maximize cultural excellence? Does Nietzsche consciously argue for the creation of an
aristocratic state? There are, I think, good reasons for thinking that Nietzsche did not intend the
focal passage as either an explicit political claim or as a gesture towards some robust political
theory.
We must attend to the fact that Nietzsche thinks of the focal passage as constituting a
claim about how we might address a fundamentally existential problem—the problem of human
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significance. In its context, this passage addresses how an individual’s life might attain the
highest degree of significance. Nietzsche is very clear that he thinks that political changes are
incapable of addressing the problem of human significance. In section four of “Schopenhauer as
Educator,” for instance, Nietzsche says:
any philosophy that believes that the problem of existence can be altered or solved by a
political event is a sham and pseudophilosophy. Many states have been founded since the
beginning of the world; this is an old story. How could a political innovation possibly be
sufficient to make human beings once and for all into contented dwellers on this earth? 51
In other words, if the focal passage were part of a larger political theory, encouraging the
creation of some new state (aristocratic, democratic or otherwise), Nietzsche would be saying
that the individual’s life could attain its highest significance by means of some new political
innovation. The focal passage would be, as Rawls seems to believe, a claim about how to
rearrange the institutions of a state to benefit higher types. But, of course, that would mean that
the focal passage is itself, by Nietzsche’s own words, a sham and pseudophilosophy. As such, it
cannot possibly be the case that the focal passage is part of a conscious effort on Nietzsche’s part
to develop a political philosophy—to say nothing about Nietzsche’s being consciously prodemocracy or pro-aristocracy.
What is more, as Nietzsche says shortly thereafter:
the most extensive arrangements of our own lives are made only in order to flee from our
true task; how we like to hide our heads somewhere, as though our hundred-eyed
conscience would not find us there; how we hasten to sell our soul to the state, to
moneymaking, to social life, or to scholarship just so that we will no longer possess it; how
even in our daily work we slave away without reflection and more ardently than is
necessary to make a living because it seems to us more necessary not to stop and reflect. 52
In short, our preoccupation with political, social, and fiscal matters is not, in Nietzsche’s opinion,
the means by which we resolve the problem of human significance. Indeed, a significant amount
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of “Schopenhauer as Educator” is dedicated to highlighting just how much society—i.e., the
realm of the political, social, and fiscal—stands in the way of addressing the problem of human
significance. Rather, it is precisely our preoccupation with those matters that allows us to hide
from, and to forget about, the problem of human significance. One’s personal investment in the
well-being of the state serves only as a means of avoiding the problem Nietzsche articulates in
“Schopenhauer as Educator.” Thus, it cannot be the case that the focal passage is an expressly
political claim, for its being a political claim would be predicated upon its being a part of
Nietzsche’s own investment in the well-being of some state, and thus a means for Nietzsche
himself to hide from the problem of human significance.
Finally, we discover that Nietzsche, at least, believes that the focal passage is apolitical
by attending to the audience to whom it is addressed. According to Nietzsche, this passage is a
pedagogical tool, imparting a lesson to “be planted and cultivated in every young person.”53 In
this sense, it is addressed to society at large. Yet, the focal passage, as a seed to be planted and
cultivated in everyone, does not always take. In fact, Nietzsche seems well aware that the
message will “take” only in a select group of individuals—those types who are able (i.e., those
whose type-facts enable them) to become aware of the goal towards which their dark drive
pushes them. In short, we find that in a much more important sense, Nietzsche is not writing for
everyone. The focal passage will do its work only in those few who are of the right types and
thus, in some sense, is meant only for those few who will be able to react appropriately. This is a
common enough theme throughout Nietzsche’s corpus. All of this is to say that, in the focal
passage “what is called for is not a political transformation, but an individual one.”54 For those
who are the right types—those who possess the capacity to recognize the goal of their dark
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drives—the most significant life is one lived for the sake of the most valuable specimens. The
types of persons capable of recognizing the goal of this drive are fairly rare.
I say types because it appears that Nietzsche speaks to two types of people. The first
seems to be nascent geniuses themselves—those who are, in fact, the rare individuals towards
which all of nature strives. The focal passage, in this case, calls for the production of nascent
geniuses who alone are capable of somehow transforming the species or who are, at least, signs
of such a transformation. These individuals are exceedingly rare. The second seems to be those
who “are too weak to endure those moments of deepest communion very long”; 55 those who “are
not those human beings toward which all of nature presses onward for its own salvation.”56
Nietzsche says of this type: “We do not accomplish even this – this coming to the surface and
awakening for a fleeting instant – by means of our own strength. We have to be lifted up….”57
This type of person is not a genius, but is still consciously aware of the drive toward the
production of genius. These people are rare, too, though less so.
In summary, the focal passage cannot be evidence of a conscious effort on Nietzsche’s
part to develop a political theory of any kind. It seems that Nietzsche’s intent was, rather, to have
the focal passage do some other kind of work, namely, to act as part of a solution to the problem
of human significance. Thinking of the focal passage as part of an active effort on Nietzsche’s
part to develop a political theory results in Nietzsche contradicting himself within the same
work.

55

UM III:5, 211.
UM III:5, 211.
57 UM III:5, 211.
56

21

6

The Focal Passage as Having Political Implications

While it may be the case that Nietzsche did not intend for the focal passage to have
political implications, it may nevertheless be the case that it does. That is to say, despite the fact
that Nietzsche refuses to think of himself as a political thinker—“The conditions required to
understand me, and which in return require me to be understood…you need to be used to living
on mountains – to seeing the miserable, ephemeral little gossip of politics and national selfinterest beneath you”58 —the focal passage may nevertheless have real and important political
implications.
Here, I suggest that it is, in fact, true that the focal passage has politically significant
implications. However, contrary to what Cavell, Rawls, and others think, the focal passage does
not suggest that Nietzsche is implicitly committed to democracy or aristocracy. Rather, it
suggests that Nietzsche is committed to what might be called a “post-political” position. That is,
despite some of Nietzsche’s claims, the focal passage commits him to the necessity of some
political principles, adopted in order eventually to move beyond the political.
As mentioned in the previous section, Nietzsche claims that the focal passage should
serve as a lesson taught to young people. As a reminder, here is the focal passage again:
For surely the question is: How can your life, the life of the individual, obtain the highest
value, the deepest significance? How is it least wasted? Surely only by living for the
benefit of the rarest and most valuable specimens, not for the benefit of the majority, that
is, for the benefit of those who, taken as individuals, are the least valuable specimens. 59
The result of this lesson may be that the young person
comes to understand himself as a miscarried work of nature, as it were, but simultaneously
as testimony to the greatest and most amazing intentions of this artist. ‘In my case nature
did a bad job’ he should tell himself, ‘but I shall pay tribute to its great intention by being
at its service so that it might someday be more successful.’ 60
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This is the second type of person addressed by the focal passage—the type who are not geniuses
but are capable of attaining awareness of their “dark drive.” These individuals recognize the goal
of evolution as the production of higher types, and in doing so, one “places himself within the
circle of culture,”61 “a powerful community, one that, to be sure, is not held together by external
forms and laws, but by a fundamental idea. This is the fundamental idea of culture.”62 This type
recognizes the value of genius, and:
In effect says: ‘I see something beyond myself that is loftier and more human that I am;
help me, all of you, to achieve it, just as I will help each of you who makes the same
recognition and suffers from it, so that finally that human being might once again come
into being who senses himself to be full and infinite in knowledge and love, in perception
and ability, and who in his entire being is bound to and bound up with nature, as judge and
measure of all things.’63
This is what Nietzsche calls “the first sacrament [Weihe] of culture,” part one of a multi-stage
process that concludes with the formulation of his ideal educational institution. The first
sacrament is characterized by a complex of feelings:
being ashamed of oneself without distress, hatred of one's own shriveled narrowness,
sympathy with the genius that always raised itself above this our dullness and barrenness,
presentience for all that is in the process of becoming and is struggling, and the innermost
conviction of encountering almost everywhere nature in its need, in the way it presses
onward toward the human being, how it painfully senses that its work has once again
miscarried, and how it is everywhere nonetheless successful in producing the most
amazing outlines, features, and forms, so that the human beings among whom we live are
like a field strewn with the most precious fragments of sculptures, everything calling out:
‘Come! Help us! Complete us! Put together what belongs together! We have an
immeasurable longing to become whole!’64
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The second sacrament follows. The individual is given the second sacrament of culture when he
or she takes those experiences characteristic of the first sacrament and turns his or her gaze
outward, assessing the world in light of those experiences.
Our gaze must turn outward in order to rediscover in the great, turbulent world that desire
for culture with which it is familiar from these former, inner experiences; the individual is
supposed to use his own struggles and longing as the alphabet with which he can now spell
out the aspirations of human beings.65
In other words, the second type of person—who is not a genius herself, but is conscious of the
drive to produce genius—now recognizing her dark drive for what it is, looks at events
happening in the world and sees “out there,” so to speak, expressions of the same underlying
drive towards the production of genius. In raising oneself up to this second stage, one sees “how
universal…the striving for culture is, and how unspeakably large are the amounts of energy that
are expended in its service.”66 Yet, most of the energy expended in the service of culture is
energy expended without awareness of the purpose or goal of culture—the production of genius.
In the second stage, when one looks out at the world, one discovers “a kind of misused and
exploited culture—just take a look around you! And precisely those powers that today most
actively promote culture have ulterior motives, and they do not engage in intercourse with it for
pure and unselfish reasons.”67 That is, certain groups—moneymakers, cultivated philistines,
scholars, and most importantly, the state—make use of the universal striving for culture to
pursue their own ends.
The realization of the use and abuse of the universal striving for culture results in the
second type of person receiving the third sacrament of culture. Here, “culture demands of him
not only those inner experiences, not only the assessment of the external world that surrounds
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him, but ultimately and primarily action; that is, it demands that he fight for culture and oppose
those influences, habits, laws, and institutions in which he does not recognize his goal: the
production of genius.”68 In other words, the type of person who has dedicated herself with
awareness to the production of genius now realizes that she must actively oppose those people
and institutions that actively misuse culture for their own ends. 69
To recap: The focal passage is presented to young people as an educational lesson. What
happens, in some rare cases, is that a young person becomes aware of the universal striving
towards culture, affirming the production of genius as the goal of human evolution, thus marking
his or her entrance into the circle of culture. From this point, the young person accepts the two
following sacraments of culture, assessing the world around himself or herself in light of his or
her experiences and acting to oppose those laws and institutions that stand in the way of the
production of genius. In short, the circle of culture, as conceived of by Nietzsche, is a cultural
group, and as such, acts to separate itself from the influence of the state.
While Nietzsche thinks of culture as non-political (he uses the word ‘anti-political’), we
must ask whether the work of the circle of culture really is non-political. That is, is it possible for
the circle of culture to move beyond the influence of the state without engaging in political
action? Nietzsche seems to think so, insofar as he seems to think that the purpose of the focal
passage is antithetical to political events. But is he correct? Our answer must be “no.” For the
circle of culture to work against institutions and laws that stand in the way of its ultimate task—
the production of genius and an emphasis on cultural endeavors—it must first actively engage in
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political action. Because political action is understood as action in reference to some state, the
rejection of a current state is also, in some sense political. That is to say, there is a sense in which
revolutionary action could be called “anti-political,” insofar as revolutionary action against, say,
a dictatorship is principally a rejection of that state, yet there is another sense in which
revolutionary action is “political” insofar as it acts in reference to a current state when it works
against that state, to undermine it.
The circle of culture must begin by working to reject the influence of the state. The call to
act against the state is explicit in the third sacrament of culture. As such, the focal passage, which
produces a circle of culture, does, in fact, have some political implications, insofar as it results in
the creation of a group dedicated, initially, to the rejection of the state. Yet, it does not have the
implications that some scholars (Rawls or Cavell) believe it to have. That is, the focal passage
does not result in a circle of culture dedicated to expending energy towards the ultimate end of
producing a democratic or aristocratic state, and thus, is neither implicitly democratic nor
aristocratic.
Recall that the focal passage is meant to serve as a lesson to young people. After
receiving the lesson of the focal passage, some young people will receive the first sacrament of
culture, marking their entrance into the circle of culture, a group of individuals committed to the
production of genius. To claim that the focal passage is evidence of implicit democratic or
aristocratic commitments on Nietzsche’s part would require that the circle of culture ultimately
work towards the end of establishing a democratic or aristocratic state, for the circle of culture
can only be democratic or aristocratic insofar as it works towards the creation of a democratic or
aristocratic state. This is obviously not the case.
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In Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche says: “In the history of European culture, the rise of
the ‘Reich’ means one thing above all else: a shift in emphasis,”70 namely, a shift in emphasis
away from culture. In short, the rise of powerful states, as in the case of the rise of the Prussian
state and the establishment of the German Empire under its protection, represents a shift from the
emphasis on cultural growth to an emphasis on political and economic domination. In particular,
Nietzsche believes that the rise in the power of the Prussian government has a particularly
pernicious effect on the form of educational institutions.71 The purpose of the circle of culture
would be to shift society’s efforts back towards an emphasis on culture. In short, the job of the
circle of culture would be to oppose the power of all states, including both democratic and
aristocratic states, for “all the great ages of culture have been ages of political decline.”72 That is,
all great ages of culture have been periods when states possessed little power, regardless of the
organization of those states.
To paraphrase Leiter, Nietzsche has an almost anarchistic hostility towards political
institutions.73 Nietzsche’s circle of culture is no less hostile towards political institutions. Rawls
is correct in thinking that Nietzsche is implicitly committed to a society where, at the very least,
the circle of culture works towards the production of culture and genius. However, he is incorrect
to think that the focal passage commits Nietzsche to an endorsement of aristocratic states. To
think of the circle of culture as an aristocratic group would be to claim that the goal of the circle
of culture is to work towards the creation of aristocratic states, where, in fact, the circle of
culture’s work is to reject the influence of states wholesale.
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In short, the goal of the circle of culture is to move beyond the political. That is why
Nietzsche says that he is concerned with those who direct themselves “beyond the well-being of
a state, that is, with philosophers, and with these only in respect to a world that, for its part, is
quite independent of the well-being of the state: the world of culture.”74 Yet, in order to move
beyond the well-being of the state, one must first actively oppose the state. As such, the circle of
culture must, at first, be a politically- motivated group, actively opposing the influence of the
state in order eventually to divorce itself from the state’s influence. It is only through an active
rejection of the state’s influence, by fighting for culture and opposing “those influences, habits,
laws, and institutions in which he does not recognize his goal: the production of genius”75 that
the circle of culture can move past the political. The circle of culture must first become antipolitical before it can become post-political.
While it is certainly true that Nietzsche’s circle of culture is implicitly committed to
action against the state, it is not the case that it is committed to the creation of a democratic or
aristocratic state. Thus, it is also not the case that the circle of culture is, strictly speaking, antipolitical. Rather, it is post-political, because it ultimately aims to move beyond the stage where it
must actively reject the state as a means to achieving the ultimate end of divorcing itself from the
influence of all states.
7

Conclusion

This paper began with two questions. First, whether the focal passage provides evidence
of a conscious effort on Nietzsche’s part to form a political philosophy that is either prodemocratic or pro-aristocratic, and second, whether the focal passage implies (regardless of
Nietzsche’s intentions), an endorsement of democracy or aristocracy. Nietzsche’s general
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hostility towards the political in “Schopenhauer as Educator,” in addition to the fact that
Nietzsche believes that the political and cultural are antagonistic forces, seems to indicate that
Nietzsche had no intentions of developing any sort of political philosophy, meaning that he, at
the very least, did not intend to endorse the creation of a democratic or aristocratic state. And,
while the focal passage does, indeed, have politically significant implications they are not of the
sort mentioned by Rawls, Cavell and others. The focal passage leads to the formation of a group,
dedicated to rejecting the influence of all states, in an effort eventually to divorce itself from the
influence of the state. Toward that end, the circle of culture would reject both an aristocratic state
and a democratic state, for states of any sort would exert an unacceptable influence on the circle
of culture. In short, the ideas of an “Aristocratic Nietzsche” and a “Democratic Nietzsche” are
both unsupported by the focal passage. Politicizing readings of Nietzsche’s work that rely on the
focal passage are mistaken, specifically because the focal passage neither explicitly nor
implicitly endorses the creation of an aristocratic or a democratic state. At best, it commits
Nietzsche to post-political position, wherein the circle of culture must initially engage in
politically revolutionary activity, towards the ultimate end of liberating itself from the influence
of the state.
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